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Product and Factor Markets
Xiaobo Zhang and Kong-Yam Tan
The purpose of economic reform is to reduce distortions and enhance efficiency.
However, when reforms are partial and incremental, individuals and local govern-
ments are often able to capture the rent inherent in the gradual transition process.
Young (2000) warned that such rent-seeking behavior might lead to increasing market
fragmentation. Empirical studies have shown the opposite in the product market. This
article argues that as the rent from China’s product market has been squeezed out due
to deepening reforms, rent-seeking behavior may have shifted to the capital market.
Further reforms are needed in the capital market to squeeze out these rent-seeking
opportunities, just as those from the product and labor markets were squeezed out
earlier. JEL Code: D33, D61, D63, O11, O53, P23.
Over the past 25 years, China’s transformation from a centrally planned to an
increasingly market-driven economy has led to substantial efficiency gains and
rapid economic growth (Maddison 1998; Fan, Zhang and Robinson 2003).
However, as Young (2000) argues, the reforms may not have been sufficiently
complete to improve domestic market integration. This could happen, for
example, if increased interregional competition as a result of fiscal decentralization
led local governments to impose trade protection measures against each other.
Young’s work has stimulated a series of studies to investigate trends in
market integration. A recent survey by the China State Council Development
Research Center (2003) indicates that China’s domestic product markets have
become more rather than less integrated. Measures of regional protection have
also declined significantly over the past decade. Wei and Fan (2004) show that
output prices have become more integrated. Huang, Rozelle, and Chang (2004)
use evidence from the rice market to argue that China’s commodity markets
are becoming increasingly integrated as a result of the reforms. Based on a
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panel data set of 32 industries at the two-digit level of aggregation in 29 pro-
vinces, Bai and others (2004) find, after an initial decline, an increase in
regional specialization of industrial production, suggesting diminishing impedi-
ments to regional trade flows. These findings appear to contradict Young’s pre-
dictions about worsening market fragmentation.
Besides the final goods market, it is also possible that distortions occur in
factor markets. De Brauw and others (2002) show that there has been a huge
transfer of rural labor from the low-productivity farming sector to high-
productivity nonfarm sectors over the past two decades, suggesting a shift
toward a more integrated rural labor market. Using the population census data
to examine labor flows across provinces, Poncet (2003) concludes that the inter-
provincial border barriers to labor migration have declined from the 1980s to
the 1990s. Zhang and others (2005) find that returns to education in nonpublic
enterprises caught up with those in state-owned enterprises, indicating increas-
ing labor mobility across sectors. Yet numerous studies suggest that there is still
significant segmentation in the labor market (Meng 2000; Knight and Li 2005).
China has instituted several financial market reforms, such as the establish-
ment of a stock market and regionalization of major banks. Yi (2003) argues
that these reforms have made China’s financial market more efficient.
However, several empirical studies reach the opposite conclusion. Fan, Zhang,
and Robinson (2003) find that the provincial marginal rates of return to capital
in agriculture, urban industry, urban services, and rural enterprises have
diverged since 1985. Boyreau-Debray and Wei (2003) use two methods to test
the degree of capital market fragmentation based on provincial data for 1978–
2000. The first approach is to examine the correlation of local savings and
investment. In an integrated capital market the correlation should be low. The
second approach, drawing from the risk-sharing literature, is to check the
degree of consumption smoothing across time and space, which is an important
indicator of capital mobility and asset market completeness. Both approaches
show that the capital market has become more fragmented.1
1. Recent rent-seeking activities in the banking and real estate sectors include those of Yang Xiuzhu,
vice chief of the construction department of Zhejiang Province, who extracted bribes from property
developers and disappeared (Caijing July 23, 2003); Shanghai real estate tycoon, Zhou Zhengyi, who was
implicated in an array of illegal loans coupled with default on statutory compensations for relocatees whose
homes were improperly demolished for redevelopment projects (Shanghai Daily, September 6, 2003); Chen
Kai, a local government official of Fuzhou, Fujian Province, who borrowed an estimated $50 million from
six state banks and provided kickbacks of around 5 percent of the loans to the lending officers (Washington
Post, December 17, 2003); former chairman of China Everbright Group, Zhu Xiaohua, who was sentenced
to 15 years in jail in November 2002 for taking bribes worth 4 million yuan (Caijing, December 25, 2002);
and Zhu Yaoming, a stock speculator who was arrested in July 2003 for loan fraud involving 2 billion
yuan, which he borrowed from securities firms and banks to speculate on stocks in the Shanghai and
Shenzhen stock exchanges (Caijing, December 25, 2003). Numerous Communist Party officials have also
been ousted for accepting bribes involving property and real estate projects. They include the former mayor
of Shanghai, Chen Liangyu; the former general secretary of Guizhou Province, Liu Fangren; former general
secretary of Hebei Province, Cheng Weigao; former Minister of Land and Resources, Tian Fengshan; a
former vice mayor of Shenzhen City; and a former mayor and a vice mayor of Shenyang City.
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In summary, the empirical literature on trends in market fragmentation and
its extent is inconclusive. Most studies focus on either product or factor
markets and over a short period only. The objective of this article is to docu-
ment the evolution of both product and factor markets using a more integrated
framework over a longer period covering the entire course of economic tran-
sition and reforms. To assess the degree of factor market fragmentation, the
economy is divided into four sectors: urban industry, urban services, agricul-
ture, and rural enterprises (all nonfarm activities such as rural industry, con-
struction, transportation, and commerce). The analysis is based on estimating
production functions for each sector, using provincial time series data for
1978–2001. One side contribution of the analysis is the computation of a
capital stock series by sector, using fixed investment data from the National
Bureau of Statistics that are not yet fully available publicly. The estimated par-
ameters from the regression equations are used to quantify the regional vari-
ation in the marginal products of capital and labor by sector. The results
confirm that labor markets are becoming more integrated, but also show that
capital markets have become more fragmented. As the reforms in the product
markets have deepened, distortions seem to have shifted to the capital market.
In this sense, Young’s (2000) argument is still valid: in a partially reformed
economy distortions may beget more distortions. However, the distortions may
not necessarily stay in the same sector.
The article first reviews the history of market development in China in the
second half of the twentieth century. It then presents data on changes in labor
and capital productivity across sectors and regions in the Chinese economy
over recent decades and explores trends in product market integration.
Regional variations in the marginal products of capital and labor are quantified
and serve as good indicators of factor market integration. The efficiency gains
for economic growth are simulated with the current barriers to factor flows
across regions and sectors removed. A supplemental appendix, available at
http://wber.oxfordjournals.org provides additional details about the data.
I . M A R K E T D E V E L O P M E N T I N C H I N A
This section briefly summarizes market development in China in the twentieth
century.
Product Market
Market fragmentation has a long history in China. In the early 1950s,
China adopted a “self-sufficient” agricultural and industrial policy at both
national and provincial levels (Lin, Cai, and Li 1996). Provinces were
encouraged to develop their own industries and ensure enough grain pro-
duction. However, the underlying economic structure was often inconsistent
with a region’s comparative advantage. Therefore, local governments had to
impose various protections on local products. The planning system led to
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serious shortages in final goods, forcing the government to impose rationing
on consumers as well.
Since the economic reforms of the late 1970s, China has decentralized its
fiscal system to provide more incentives for local governments to develop their
economies (Zhang 2006). Under the fierce competition that resulted from fiscal
decentralization, interest groups in provinces and cities were eager to protect
their local interests. Regional trade wars broke out in the 1980s and early
1990s (Young 2000). In responding to the crises of regional trade blockades,
the National People’s Congress passed the “Law on Unjust Competition” in
1993, and in 2001 the State Council issued order 303 “Stipulation of the State
Council to Forbid Regional Blockade in Market Activities.”
Labor Market
In the 1950s, the government established the hukou system of household regis-
tration, confining people to the village or city of their birth, to ensure enough
agricultural labor to produce sufficient grain to support the industrial and
urban sector. Rural and urban labor markets became totally segmented (Yang
and Zhou 1999).
Since the 1980s, China has gradually reduced institutional barriers to
migration (for more detail on China’s labor market development, see Fleshier
and Yang 2003 and World Bank 2005). In 1983, farmers were permitted to
engage in transport and marketing of their products beyond local markets. In
1988, the central government permitted farmers to work in cities under the
condition that they had to provide their own staples. Since the early 1990s,
various measures have been introduced to further relax the hukou system and
encourage greater rural to urban labor mobility. Some cities have adopted a
selective migration policy, issuing permanent residency to migrants who paid a
fee, invested in local business, or bought expensive houses in the city. In
addition, urban reforms of housing, employment policies, and the social secur-
ity system; the lifting of rationing; and expansion of urban nonstate sectors
have made it easier for migrant workers to live in cities.
Despite progress in reducing institutional barriers to labor mobility, some
obstacles still impede population movement across regions (Fleisher and Yang
2003). For instance, most rural migrants in cities are unable to obtain
legal residence permits and are treated as second-class citizens. They have to
pay much higher fees for healthcare and schools than legal residents.
Discriminatory treatment of rural migrant workers in employment and social
services is commonplace, particularly in the formal sector.
Capital Market
In the central planning era, banks were the dominant source of business
financing (World Bank 2005). They provided loans primarily to formal state
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enterprises within their locality. The central government exerted direct control
over banks. Administrative rather than market forces determined capital
movements. The major role of banks was to provide equity financing and to
support national development strategies.
Since the late 1970s, China has conducted a series of banking sector
reforms. In 1983, the four state-owned commercial banks (Bank of China,
Agricultural Bank of China, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, and
Construction Bank of China) were reorganized to become more market
oriented. In addition to direct vertical control within the bank, local govern-
ments were granted more horizontal controls over bank branches. As the
economy developed rapidly, so did demand for credit. Local governments
tightened their control over local bank branches by blocking saving deposits
from moving elsewhere. Many local governments forced banks in their
jurisdiction to extend credit to them, creating serious inflation in the early
1990s.
Since 1994 the central government has reasserted its control over the banks,
ended local government control of bank branches, and set up regional banks to
encourage capital mobility across provinces. However, loopholes remain in the
system. In particular, local governments can use land to acquire loans to finance
infrastructure (World Bank 2005). Once land is acquired from farmers for
public purposes, local governments and developers can use this “state-owned”
land as collateral for credit from the local branches of state banks. Land
banking is a major driver of the rapid growth in infrastructure investment in
China (Zhang 2006).
Even after the establishment of the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges
in December 1990, banks have retained a dominate role in financial markets.
In 2000, the banking system accounted for about two-thirds of financial trans-
actions, while the bond and stock market accounted for only 5 percent of
financial flows (World Bank 2005). There have been many abnormal phenom-
ena in the development of the stock market (Lin 2004). Most listed companies
are state-owned enterprises and in general perform worse than nonpublic enter-
prises (Chen 2003). Many listed companies performed well initially, but their
performance deteriorated after the first year. The turnover rate has been much
higher than in other countries. The scale of stock market activity is too small
to contribute significantly to capital mobility across regions and sectors, some-
thing it should be able to do as it grows.
Despite the financial sector reforms, rural small businesses still find it harder
to obtain credit than do urban-based, state-owned enterprises. The recent
arrest and release of millionaire entrepreneur Sun Dawu highlights the
problem. Because of the difficulties in raising funds from state-owned banks
and credit cooperatives, Mr. Sun solicited deposits from his employees and
local rural residents, which violated the state law (Economist 2004). Anecdotal
evidence aside, more research is needed to quantify whether the capital market
has become more integrated or more fragmented.
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I I . C H A N G E S I N F A C T O R P R O D U C T I V I T Y
Driven largely by institutional reforms, the Chinese economy has experienced a
dramatic transformation over recent decades.2 The share of agricultural GDP
in total GDP declined from more than half in 1952 to less than 20 percent in
2001, while the share of the rural nonfarm sector increased from almost zero
to more than a quarter. Coupled with these structural changes was a massive
shift of labor from the lower productivity agricultural sector to the higher pro-
ductivity nonfarm sector.
Growth in labor and capital productivity by region and sector highlights the
dramatic changes in factor markets and economic structure over the period
1978–2001 (tables 1 and 2). Labor and capital productivities are calculated as
the ratios of GDP to labor and capital; they are therefore measures of average
not marginal productivity.
There are large regional variations in labor productivity, and they have
widened over time. The northeast region had the highest labor productivity in
1978, but by 2001 it had fallen well behind the eastern region. The regional
gap between the west and the rest of China has worsened over time. Compared
with labor productivity, the regional disparities in capital productivity are
much smaller, and they have narrowed over time.
Labor productivity grew fastest in the rural nonfarm sector and slowest in
the agricultural sector (see table 2). Labor productivity began at a relatively
low level in agriculture, and the gap with other sectors is now much wider.
The transfer of rural labor from farm to nonfarm activities will undoubtedly
have enhanced overall economic growth and labor productivity. The rural
nonfarm sector also experienced the most rapid growth in capital productivity
and by 2001 had achieved the highest level of all sectors. These disparities
highlight capital market imperfections and the hunger for credit and capital
that remains within rural areas for nonfarm activities. Broadening access to
credit and investing more in the rural nonfarm sector would enhance economic
efficiency and growth.
A comparison of the labor productivity of the industrial and service sectors
relative to agriculture for China and several other Asian countries helps to put
China’s economic transformation in a broader international perspective
(table 3). The differences are stark. The labor productivity ratio of industry to
agriculture is much higher in China than in other Asian countries. Moreover,
while the ratios for other countries have generally remained stable or fallen, the
ratio for China has risen substantially over the past 20 years. The same is true
for the labor productivity ratio between services and agriculture. These extre-
mely high ratios for China as well their increasing trends are symptomatic of
2. Lin (1992) provides a good reference for rural reforms; Groves and others (1994) cover the
reforms of state-owned enterprises; Lau, Qian, and Roland (2000) explain the rationale behind the
successful price reforms.
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major distortions in China’s factor markets. There appears to be considerable
potential for further economic growth simply by reallocating labor and capital
among sectors.
I I I . T R E N D S I N P R O D U C T M A R K E T I N T E G R A T I O N
This section updates Young’s (2000) analysis of the trends in product market
integration. As in Young, the analysis uses the following sum of the squared
deviations of the sectoral output shares of China’s provinces from the group












NwiðSij  SjÞ2 ð2Þ
where Sij denotes the share of sector j in province i’s output; Sj is the group
average Sij across provinces; wi denotes the province’s share of total GDP of N
TABLE 1. Labor and Capital Productivity by Region
Productivity China East Central Western Northeast
Labor productivity
1978 868 1,073 707 619 1,672
1984 1,260 1,655 1,046 853 2,072
1990 1,841 2,578 1,471 1,201 2,912
1995 3,356 5,429 2,567 1,842 4,409
2001 5,949 9,694 4,468 3,223 8,063
Growth rate (%) 8.7 10.0 8.3 7.4 7.1
Capital productivity
1978 36 41 38 25 45
1984 42 45 43 32 47
1990 41 42 42 36 43
1995 53 56 55 43 51
2001 52 52 54 47 57
Growth rate (%) 1.6 1.0 1.5 2.7 1.1
Note: The unit of labor productivity is 1978 yuan; the unit of capital productivity is 1978
yuan per 100 yuan capital stock. East includes the municipalities of Beijing, Shanghai, and
Tianjin, and the provinces of Fujian, Guangdong, Hainan, Hebei, Jiangsu, Shangdong, and
Zhejiang. Central includes Anhui, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, and Shanxi Provinces. West
includes the autonomous regions of Nei Mongol, Ningxia, Tibet, and Xinjiang, and the provinces
of Gansu, Guangxi, Guizhou, Ningxia, Qinghai, Shanxi, Sichuan, and Yunnan. Northeast
includes Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning Provinces.
Source: Calculated by the authors based on the data for 28 provinces, which are slightly differ-
ent from those based on national data. For details on the data see supplemental appendix S.1,
available at http://wber.oxfordjournals.org.
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provinces and S¯j ¼
P
wi Sij. In the absence of trade, a region would return to
an autarky type of Robinson economy, with a production structure diversified
to cope with daily needs for food, clothes, shelter, and so on. Therefore,
without trade, the likelihood of having a specialized production structure is
much smaller than with trade integration. It is expected that the more barriers
there are to interregional trade, the more similar the composition of output
across provinces and the smaller the value of the measures.
Graphing the unweighted and weighted measures of the composition of output
shares for 1978–2001 shows similar results—the composition of output con-
verges up to the early 1990s and diverges thereafter (figure 1). Product market
development follows a U-shaped curve. An initial decline is followed by an
upward trend that leads to a higher overall degree of regional specialization in
2001 than in 1978. The convergence between 1978 and the early 1990s replicates
Young’s (2000) finding that China’s product market became more fragmented.
However, the upward trend of the measures since the early 1990s indicates that
product markets have become more integrated. The evolving pattern of regional
integration reported here for a four-sector disaggregation of GDP also echoes the
findings of Bai and others (2004) based on a 36-industry breakdown. The turn-
ingpoint coincides with the time when the central government took serious
measures to remove interregional trade barriers. The initial market reforms may
have brought about more distortions in the short run, but with deepening reform,
the barriers in the product markets were broken down over time.
Figure 2 presents the standard deviation of the logarithmic provincial GDPs
per capita of farming, urban industry, urban service, and rural nonfarm
TABLE 2. Labor and Capital Productivity by Sector
Productivity China Agriculture Urban industry Urban services Rural nonfarm
Labor productivity
1978 868 346 3,245 1,949 623
1984 1,260 509 3,783 2,883 856
1990 1,841 585 5,713 4,615 1,510
1995 3,356 761 8,597 6,275 4,917
2001 5,949 987 23,074 9,573 8,193
Growth rate (%) 8.7 4.7 8.9 7.2 11.9
Capital productivity
1978 36 52 46 19 22
1984 42 74 45 26 30
1990 41 78 38 30 59
1995 53 74 45 33 121
2001 52 57 51 25 192
Growth rate (%) 1.6 0.4 0.5 1.1 9.8
Note: The unit of labor productivity is 1978 yuan; the unit of capital productivity is 1978
yuan per 100 yuan capital stock.
Source: Calculated by the authors based on provincial data. For details on the data see sup-
plemental appendix S.1, available at http://wber.oxfordjournals.org.
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activities. The variations in output per capita of urban industry and urban ser-
vices are steady up to 1990 and then increase rapidly. The standard deviation
of output per capita of farming increases by 81 percent from 1978 to 1994 and
levels off thereafter, while the spatial distribution of rural nonfarm activity
becomes increasingly uneven over the whole sample period. However, as
Young (2000, p. 1111) notes: “The imposition of trade barriers has clear
TABLE 3. Trends in the Labor Productivity of the Industry and Service Sectors





































Source: World Bank, various years, World Development Indicators.
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implications for the interregional variation in output shares; it has no predic-
tion regarding the variation in absolute output levels.” Nonetheless, the vari-
ations of output per capita in the four sectors offer useful information on the
evolution of spatial distribution of economic activities.
I V. VA R I A T I O N S I N M A R G I N A L P R O D U C T S O F C A P I T A L A N D L A B O R
Following the analysis above of recent trends in product market integration,
this section turns to an analysis of possible fragmentation in factor markets.
Resource allocation is most efficient when the marginal product of each input
is equalized across sectors and regions. Thus intersectoral and interregional
FIGURE 1. Convergence in the Composition of Output
Note: The measures are the weighted and unweighted sum of squared deviations of the
sectoral output shares of China’s provinces from the national average. Source: Authors’ analysis
based on data described in supplemental appendix S.1, available at http://wber.oxfordjournals.org
FIGURE 2. Standard Deviation of ln GDP Per Capita
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data described in supplemental appendix S.1, available at
http://wber.oxfordjournals.org.
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variations in the marginal product of each factor can show the degree of factor
market distortions and hence opportunities for achieving greater economic effi-
ciency through improved factor allocation.3
Assume that real value added (GDP) by sector follows a well-behaved, neo-
classical production function:
Yit ¼ fitðXi1t; . . . ; Xijt; . . . ; Ximt; TÞ ð3Þ
where Xijt is input j for sector i in year t. A thornier question is what functional
form of the production function to use. Considering both econometric esti-
mation and theoretical consistency, the following Cobb-Douglas functional
form can be specified:4




where Ait ¼ ai0 þ aitt þ aittt2
or Ait ¼ ci0 þ
X
citDt: ð4Þ
Dt is a set of year dummy variables, and cit is the corresponding coefficient.
The parameters in equation (4) corresponding to labor and capital are their
elasticities. The estimated function for agriculture includes arable land as a
separate input in addition to capital and labor. Because arable land area does
not change much and is location specific, provincial dummy variables cannot
be used to control for potential heteroscedasticity. As a compromise, dummy
variables for the eastern, central, and western regions are added to the pro-
duction functions. To capture technological change over time, the time trend
and its square are included in one specification. In a second specification, the
fixed effects of year dummy variables are added.
To estimate production functions for each of the four sectors, data are used
for 28 provinces for 24 years (1978–2001), providing a panel of 672 obser-
vations. Tibet is excluded mainly because of lack of data. For data consistency,
Chongqing and Hainan Provinces are included in Guangdong and Sichuan
Provinces, although they were separated in 1987 and 1997. A detailed
3. Desai and Martin (1983) estimated the efficiency loss due to resource misallocation in industry in
the former Soviet Union using a similar method. Syrquin (1988) conducted a similar exercise.
4. It is well known that the Cobb-Douglas form has caveats. It assumes constant returns to scale
and strong separability among inputs. To test the robustness of the results on the first caveat, Zhang and
Tan (2004) present an alternative specification using a varying coefficient model, and the basic findings
are the same. Several flexible functional forms have been put forward to address the separability
problem. However, their limitations have been increasingly recognized in the empirical literature
(Chambers 1988). For example, the multicollinearity problem inherent among the interactive terms and
the fewer restrictions on the underlying production technology often lead to results that do not make
much economic sense.
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description of the data used is provided in the supplemental appendix (avail-
able at http://wber.oxfordjournals.org/).
The results of the estimated production functions for the four sectors under
two different specifications are presented in table 4.5 Because agricultural
output is measured as value added, intermediate inputs such as fertilizer are
excluded from output measures by definition. Including fertilizer and other
intermediate inputs is more appropriate in estimating a production function for
gross output. The results under the two different specifications are similar. The
adjusted R2s are high for all the regressions, indicating a good fit. The year
dummy variables in the first specifications are jointly significant in all four
regressions. Most coefficients for the time trend variables in the second specifi-
cation are statistically significant.
The regression results for agriculture indicate that land still plays an impor-
tant role in Chinese agricultural production. Among the regressions for all the
sectors labor elasticity is larger than capital elasticity, indicating that China’s
comparative advantage lies in labor-intensive production.
Differences in estimated elasticities for the same input across sectors reflect
differences in production technology, but on their own do not provide any indi-
cation of how efficiently resources are allocated. To obtain such insights, it is
necessary to calculate the marginal productivities of each factor. The marginal
product of each factor is equal to the product of the estimated elasticity and






Figure 3 presents the marginal product of labor and capital by sector. The mar-
ginal product of labor is much higher in urban areas than in the farming and
rural nonfarm sector, indicating huge potential gains from rural to urban labor
migrations. In 1990, the marginal product of labor in urban industry was
about 19 times that of agriculture and the marginal product of labor of urban
services was about 13 times that of agriculture. The results are comparable to
the findings in Yang and Zhou (1999) that the ratios of the marginal product
of labor in the state sector to the agricultural sector was about 15 and 16
between 1988 and 1992. The ratio of the marginal product of labor in the
rural nonfarm sector to the farming sector in 1990 was 3.6 in 1990, similar to
the 3.7 in 1992 reported by Wang (1997). In 1993, the Company Law was
passed to encourage privatization of town and village enterprises. As a result,
their share in gross industrial output value jumped from 20 to 25 percent while
5. The calculations of variations in marginal products of factors are rather robust to various
specifications in large part because marginal products are determined mainly by factor productivity
across sectors rather than by the estimated elasticities. For simplicity, the inequality measures based on
several alternative specifications are not reported here but are available on request.
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TABLE 4. Estimated Production Functions by Sector, China
Specification I Specification II
Agriculture Urban industry Urban service Rural nonfarm Agriculture Urban industry Urban service Rural nonfarm
Labor 0.430* (0.026) 0.852* (0.037) 0.708* (0.036) 0.601* (0.026) 0.428* (0.026) 0.819* (0.037) 0.694* (0.036) 0.565* (0.026)
Capital 0.111* (0.018) 0.256* (0.036) 0.263* (0.029) 0.364* (0.031) 0.114* (0.018) 0.287* (0.038) 0.273* (0.029) 0.406* (0.032)
Land 0.386* (0.031) 0.386* (0.031)
Eastern region 0.081* (0.039) 0.376* (0.039) 0.373* (0.051) –0.325* (0.056) 0.079* (0.039) 0.373* (0.040) 0.363* (0.051) –0.330* (0.058)
Central region 20.203* (0.033) 20.152* (0.040) 0.107* (0.051) 20.391* (0.055) 20.203* (0.032) 20.156* (0.040) 0.105* (0.043) 20.378* (0.058)
Western region 20.521* (0.035) 0.044 (0.047) 0.018 (0.048) 20.818* (0.057) 20.522* (0.035) 0.030 (0.047) 0.010 (0.048) 20.791* (0.059)
Year dummy variable Yes* Yes* Yes* Yes*
T 0.071* (0.005) 0.110 (0.659) 0.088* (0.007) 0.037* (0.009)
T2/100 0.112* (0.020) 0.245* (0.026) 20.171* (0.029) 0.323* (0.037)
Adjusted R2 0.951 0.928 0.917 0.958 0.951 0.928 0.917 0.954
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
Note: Figures in parenthesis are standard errors.












that of state enterprises dropped from 43 to 34 per cent from 1993 to 1995
(China National Bureau of Statistics, China Statistical Yearbook, p. 401,
1996). The large difference in marginal product of labor suggests potential
gains in aggregate output from labor mobility across sectors.
The graph of the marginal product of capital by sector shows that the
nonfarm sector has grown much faster than other sectors and by 2001 has the
highest value among the four sectors (see figure 3). The marginal product of
capital is lowest in the farming and urban service sectors.
Overall, the differences in marginal product of factors across sectors are
quite large. A generalized entropy (GE) inequality measure was used to quan-
tify the degree of variation in the marginal products of inputs across the
4 sectors and 28 provinces.6 Because each province has four sectors, there are
FIGURE 3. Marginal Products of Labor and Capital
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data described in supplemental appendix S.1, available at
http://wber.oxfordjournals.org.
6. Other measures are also used, and the results are similar. Following Shorrocks (1980), the GE




























where Mijk denotes the marginal product of factor k for sector j in province i, m is the arithmetic sample
mean, and wij is the share of GDP of sector j for province i in total GDP. GE(0) is the mean logarithmic
deviation, GE(1) is the Theil index, and GE(2) equals half the square of the coefficient of variation. In
principle, the GE measures are sensitive to various parts of the distribution depending on the selected
value of c. The simplest form of this equation was used in which c ¼ 0. When c ¼ 0, it is the mean
logarithm deviation and more sensitive to the bottom part of the distribution. The results are similar for
c ¼ 1 and c ¼ 2. The reason for using GE is its appealing property of decomposing overall inequality
into between- and within-group subcomponents.
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2,688 observations in all. Figure 4 graphs the variations in the marginal pro-
ducts of labor and capital.
The marginal product of labor has shown some convergence over the reform
period, except in the last five years of the analysis (which may be the result of
changes in the way the labor surveys were conducted during those years; see
supplemental appendix). Variation in the marginal product of capital, in con-
trast, was steady between 1978 and the early 1990s before rising substantially.
The divergence in the marginal product of capital during the 1990s indicates
greater fragmentation of capital markets. This finding is consistent with that of
Boyrau-Debray and Wei (2003). These results suggest that as competition
intensified in product and labor markets, distortions may have shifted to
banking, real estate, and infrastructure projects. In this sense, the findings
support Young’s (2000) argument that partial reforms may lead to more distor-
tions in the rest of the economy.
The GE family of inequality measures can be decomposed into the sum of
within- and between-group components for any given partitioning of the popu-
lation into mutually exclusive and exhaustive groups. Figure 4 graphs the
between- and within-group (region and sector) components of the variation in
the marginal products of capital and labor. The ratio of the between-group
component to overall inequality is called the polarization index (Kanbur and
Zhang 1999; Zhang and Kanbur 2001). Intersectoral variations in the marginal
products of labor and capital contribute far more to overall inequality than
interregional variation. In particular, the sectoral polarization index on the
marginal product of capital has increased. This provides further evidence that
FIGURE 4. Variations in Marginal Product of Labor and Capital
Note: The blank bars show the within-sector or -region variation, while the solid bars show
the between-component variation. Source: Authors’ analysis based on data described in
supplemental appendix S.1, available at http://wber.oxfordjournals.org.
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as the reform process has deepened in the product market, the capital market
has become more distorted.
These results indicate that there is room to improve China’s overall econo-
mic efficiency simply by reallocating factors among sectors and regions.
Reversing the entrenched urban-biased investment policies and undertaking
in-depth reforms within the financial sector would not only have the greatest
impact on economic efficiency but would also promote greater equity as most
poor people live and work in rural areas.
V. P O L I C Y S I M U L A T I O N S
How large are the potential gains from improving factor market performance?
To answer this question, estimated production functions from the first specifi-
cation in table 4 are used to calculate the potential increases in national GDP
resulting from simulated factor reallocations.7 Supplemental appendix S.2
reports the underlying models and baseline information. As a first step, the
models are calibrated to obtain the constant terms in the production functions
of the four sectors based on the estimated elasticities on labor, capital, and
GDP information for 2001. Doing that means that the production functions
will predict the actual results for 2001. Next, the calibrated models are used in
the four sectors to conduct policy simulations.
Considering the low level of labor productivity in the agricultural sector, the
first experiment is to move additional labor out of that sector. With 2001 as a
baseline, three scenarios are evaluated: moving 1, 5, and 10 percent of the agri-
cultural labor force out of agriculture and distributing it equally among the
other three sectors (table 5). Reallocating even 1 percent of the agricultural
labor force could increase national GDP by 0.9 percent. Reallocating 5 percent
or 10 percent increases national GDP by 4.4 percent or 8.8 percent. The results
are supported by an independent early study by Yang and Zhou (1999), who
find gains in aggregate output of 0.7 percent, 3.1 percent, and 5.8 percent
based on the same three hypothetical percentage transfers of labor using 1992
as a baseline.
The second experiment simulates a change in the current urban-biased poli-
cies by shifting capital from cities to rural areas while keeping total capital con-
stant. Reallocating 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent of urban capital to
rural areas leads to gains in national GDP of 0.5 percent, 2.1 percent, and
3.9 percent.
7. Policy simulations point out only the potential gains from reform. However, questions remain on
the mapping from simulations to actual reforms. In addition, there are no standard errors. Therefore the
precision cannot be assessed. It is likely that the simulations results depend on the underlying functional
forms as well as the accuracy of the data. We are reassured in that simulations based on a varying
coefficient model have led to similar findings (Zhang and Tan 2004). In 5, we also check the robustness
of the results by undertaking similar simulations with a baseline of higher labor productivity in the
agriculture sector.
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The third experiment assumes that the government allocates all the addi-
tional investment in rural areas and distributes it equally between the agricul-
tural and rural nonfarm sectors. The investment is converted into capital stock
using a discount rate of 4 percent and a national fixed asset price index.8 An
additional 10 billion yuan of investment in rural areas yields a 0.03 percent
increase in national GDP, equivalent to 2.9 billion 2001 yuan. Considering
that the farm and rural nonfarm sectors are labor intensive, this scenario
would likely also boost the incomes of many of the poorest people in China.
When investment increases to 50 billion yuan, national GDP rises by 0.15
percent (14.3 billion yuan) and when it increases to 100 billion yuan GDP
rises by 0.29 percent (28.4 billion yuan). Because the capital does not vanish
immediately, the long-term impact is much higher. Assuming a 4 percent dis-
count rate, the annual internal rate of returns to the investment in rural areas is
more than 20 percent.
The next experiment considers a counterfactual scenario in which all the
additional investment is distributed evenly in the two urban sectors. Under the
three scenarios of investment of 10, 50, and 100 billion yuan, national GDP
increases by 0.92, 4.58, and 9.16 billion yuan, respectively. As shown in the
last row of the table, the rate of returns to rural investment is almost four times
of that to urban investment.
TABLE 5. Impact of Alternative Policy Simulations on China’s GDP
Experiment Results
Move x% of the agricultural labor force out of
farming
1% 5% 10%
Change in GDP (%) 0.89 (0.89) 4.42 (4.22) 8.77 (8.78)
Reallocate x% investment from cities to rural areas 1% 5% 10%
Change in GDP (%) 0.46 (0.41) 2.13 (1.90) 3.90 (3.45)
Add x billion yuan of investment in rural areas 10 50 100
Change in GDP over 2001 (%) 0.03 (0.03) 0.15 (0.14) 0.29 (0.27)
Change in GDP over 2001 (billion yuan) 3.66 18.26 32.31
Add x billion yuan of investment in urban areas 10 50 100
Change in GDP over 2001 (%) 0.01 (0.01) 0.04 (0.04) 0.07 (0.08)
Change in GDP over 2001 (billion yuan) 0.92 (1.03) 4.58 (5.16) 9.16 (10.30)
The ratio of returns to investment in rural areas to
urban areas
3.99 (3.60) 3.98 (3.59) 3.97 (3.58)
Note: The figures in the parentheses are the simulation results based on adjusted national GDP
data.
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data described in supplemental appendix S.1, available at
http://wber.oxfordjournals.org.
8. For the period 1991–2001, the national fixed asset price index is available from the China
Statistical Yearbook. However, it was not published prior to 1991. Therefore, the national GDP deflator
is used a proxy for the period, 1978–91. For the whole period the calculated capital price index is 3.53,
compared with the published GDP deflator of 3.33.
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The National Statistical Bureau adjusted national GDP figures based on the
first economic census in 2004. To check the robustness of the results, the con-
stant terms in the four production functions were recalibrated as shown in sup-
plemental appendix S.2 using the adjusted 2001 GDP data by sector, and the
same set of simulations was undertaken. The basic results are similar to those
based on original GDP figures (see table 5).
The policy simulation highlights the potential economic gains from reallocat-
ing factors from low- to high-productivity sectors. Removing barriers to labor
movement, reversing the urban bias in government investment policies, and
deepening reforms would significantly enhance overall economic growth. In
addition, these policy changes could bring about favorable distributional
effects by reducing regional and sectoral inequalities. Since large inequalities
are a potential source of social conflict and instability, the far-reaching social
impact of these policies could be equally important.
V I . C O N C L U S I O N S A N D P O L I C Y I M P L I C A T I O N S
The aim of China’s reforms is to reduce economic distortions and improve effi-
ciency. This article has examined the changing patterns of distortions during
the reform process, how past policies have contributed to these distortions, and
the estimated cost to the economy through lower output and greater regional
and sectoral disparity. The empirical findings indicate that product markets in
China have become more integrated after a short period of increasing fragmen-
tation in the early reform period. Labor markets also have become increasingly
integrated due to a large shift in the labor force from the agricultural sector to
nonfarm sectors and relaxed constraints on migration. However, intersectoral
differences in the marginal product of capital have grown during the reform
period.
Local governments, which have been collecting rents in a partially reformed
system, are the interim winners from reform. In the short run, distortions
might beget more distortions, as Young (2000) has shown. However, in
response to the increasing fragmentation in product markets, the government
has undertaken measures to remove local protections. Consequently, there are
fewer and fewer rents to be collected in the product and labor markets over
time, and the distortions have been increasingly squeezed into the financial and
land markets (including infrastructure and real estate). For local governments,
these are the two last bastions for rent collection, as well as breeding grounds
for corruption. Looking only at the product market suggests that the market
might have become distorted in the short run. However, as the government
responded to the problems with deepening reforms, the market became inte-
grated. When all the sectors are considered, however, the results seem to
support Young’s argument that as some distortions in a partially reformed
economy are removed, new distortions may be added. The key is whether the
government can continue to add new reforms to squeeze out the distortions in
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the capital market as those in the product and labor markets were squeezed
out before them.
The continuing large differences in labor and capital productivity across
sectors suggests that China still has great potential for further efficiency gains
through continued structural change. To realize this potential, however, restric-
tions on factor movement, in particular, intersectoral capital movement, need
to be removed. Efficient capital markets that can funnel new investment to
sectors with higher returns still need to be developed. The higher capital
returns in the rural nonfarm sector suggest that more aggressive government
policies should be sought to increase investment there or at least not hinder its
movement. Such policies will not only improve overall economic performance,
but will also narrow the development and inequality gaps between the rural
and urban sectors. Similarly, the government should encourage labor move-
ment from agriculture to rural enterprises, urban industry, and service sectors
since labor productivity in these sectors continues to be much higher than in
the agriculture sector.
While empirical estimates and policy simulations can provide rough order of
magnitude estimates of structural problems, policy recommendations on
gradual elimination of these distortions need to take into account complex
issues of political feasibility, sequencing, implementation problems, downside
risks of policy measures, nature of vested interests and how to overcome them,
the need to minimize negative side effects, and the effects on equity, regional
disparity, and rural-urban inequality. More research is needed to understand
the political economy dimensions that have at times seriously constrained the
pace of reform. Nonetheless, simulations of alternative policy proposals and
their estimated effects could act as useful inputs to policymaking.
V I I . S U P P L E M E N T A R Y M A T E R I A L
Supplementary material is available at: http://www.wber.oxfordjournals.org/
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